[1] St Hilaire v City of Laconia, 855 F.Supp. 349 (D.H.N., 1995). 1 have taken the position of Philip’s wife, plaintiff, in recounting the facts, because police as a normal practice lie to create an insurmountable defense for their actions and likewise the courts write such testimony and facts in-a way that justifies their dismissal of the complaint. Nevertheless the court did write at 357: “Position of his body when he was shot demonstrates that he could not have been reaching for his. . . ." Nevertheless,The Court dismissed this as supposition. But it is the norm in federal courts to accept every inference made by government.

In a unique sociological study (published in a 1968 issue of Transaction), wherein the professor had the cooperation of the police chief, whom he knew personally, and anonymity was promised, it was revealed among other things, that 85% of the officers admitted that they have lied under oath to collaborate the testimony of a fellow officer. Another standard operating procedure was that if the officers assaulted the person whom they arrested, then they would charge the victim with resisting arrest.

[2] L.A. Times, Article of 1992, on the editorial page that was written by appellate Justice Reinhart. .

[3] Charles Sevilla, Wilkes on Trial, p. 209.

[4] Stone v Powell, 49 L Ed 2d 1067 (1976), at 1089.

[5] U.S. v Martinez—Fuerte, 49 L Ed 2d 1116, 1134 (1976).

[6] Florida v Bostick, 115 L Ed 2d 389 (1991). The majority skirted the issue of suspicionless search by calling such encounter with police while in transit not a seizure, meaning the passenger could refuse to allow the police to search him and his belongings. However such refusal normally resulted in a seizure: the person & belongings being removed from the train or bus and held till a search warrant was obtained. .

[7] Hustler Magazine, Dec. 1992, quoting the named newspaper and magazine.

[8] Action v Vernoia School Dist. 47J, 23 F.3d 1514 (9th Cir. 1994).

[9] Vernoia School Dist. 47J v Acton, 132 L Ed 2d 564 (1995).

[10] Rummel v Estelle, 587 F.2d 651 (5th Cir. 1978); Overturned by the en banc panel. Rummel v Estelle, 63

L Ed 2d 782 (1980).

[11] Harmelin v Michigan, 115 L Ed 2d 836 (1991). Following Harmelin, in a case were a young man fled Michigan, the Supreme Court of Quebec Province refused extradition because it found the possibility of a life sentence for cocaine so excessive as to permit applying the clause in the extradition treaty permitting an exception, namely, if the act isn't a crime in Canada or the punishment contrary to accepted Canadian norms.

[12] Duhr, unpublished case described in Smallwood below at 1347.

[13] Smallwood v Johnson, 73 F.2d 1343 (5th Cir. 1996)

[14] U.S. v Hudspeth, 42 F.3d 1015 (7th Cir. 1994). An en banc ruling for which a reading of the dissenting opinions is instructive.

[15] U.S. v Maxey, 989 F.2d 303 (9th Cir. 1993). The gun wasn't even Maxey's. He was one of 4 riding in a car that was stopped and search. The handgun was stashed under the seat. However, having access to the gun is sufficient for violation of the statute.

[16] U.S. v Frushon, 10 F.3d 663 (9th Cir. 1993).

[17] Deal v U.S, 124 L Ed 2d 44 (1993); 954 F.2d 262 (5th Cir. 1992). Both statutes, §922 and §924 require that the time given be added to the end of the sentence; viz., not ran concurrently.

[18] U.S. v McGrath, 60 F.2d 1005 (2nd Cir. 1995).

[19] Under British Common Law, the state kept the bull. Return of property wrongfully obtained to its rightful owner is of course not forfeiture, for the felon never in a legal sense own said property.

[20] There were numerous cases of officers of the law violating their trust so as to obtain upon conviction a felon's property. Other cases involved an interested party, who desired to obtain the property from the government following its forfeiture.

[21] U.S. v Premises Known as 2639 Meetinghouse, 633 F.Supp. 979 (E.D.Pa. 1986);at 993 contains part of that statute with a discussion of the prohibition, though with today's slant.

[22] Recall on the first page that the police searched the estate of Donald Scott (which resulted in his death.) because he looked like someone who might smoke marijuana and they wanted to forfeit the property, for some of the funds derived would have gone into the police's coffers.

[23] Alexander v U.S., 125 L Ed 2d 441 (1993) at 447.

[24] U.S. v Pryba, 900 F.2d 748 (4^th Cir. 1990), at 753. The Lower Court found 4 videos and 6 magazines obscene (there retail value being $105). Under Rico the Court shut down 12 stores grossing more than $2,000,000 and confiscated all their inventory. In addition there were substantial jail time for the two owners and substantial fines.

[25] The S.C. remanded the case back to the Court of Appeals to determine if the Excessive Find Clause had been violated--the façade of justice. There can be little doubt of the Tag-Team results. The Court of Appeals was aware of the Trial (District) Court disposition towards the case. In the lower-court made this clear on the record not only by the sentence fines and forfeitures but also in word: "an enormous racketeering enterprise." The sending the case back to the District Court was to add the façade of meaningful review..

[26] U.S. v One Lear Jet Aircraft, 836 F.2d 1571 (11th Cir. 1988), quoting District Court opinion 617 F.Supp. 769 (D.C. Fla. 1985) at 772.

[27] U.S.C.§1324, reprinted in 617 F.Supp. 769 at 771.

[28] Calabro v U.S., 850 F.Supp. 175 (E.D.N.Y. 1993) at 177.

[29] I have seen time-and-time-again arguments by the AUSA which blatantly ignore the facts in a case or the controlling rules of law, and I have seen time-and-time again the courts affirming such averments.

[30] Calabro supra 178.

[31] Hustler Magazine, 1992.

[32] Moore v Illinois, 14 L Ed 306 (1852); holds that who is punished by separate sovereigns

for same offence, “has committed two offences” even though he committed only one act.

[33] U.S. v Janis, 49 L Ed 2d 1046 (1976), INS and criminal prosecutions.

[34] U.S. v P.H.E., Inc., supra.)

[35] Wall Street Journal 1990, editorial page.

[36] P.H.E. supra. 852.

[37] PHE Inc. v. US Dept of Justice, 743 F.Supp 15 (D.D.C., 1990) at 16.

[38] The Supreme Court has permitted each community to determine its own standard for obscenity an unfortunate situation for national companies. Thus there have been no prosecutions in NY or CA,

[39] U.S. v Williams, 118 L Ed 2d 352 (1992)

[40] Id. 393.

The right to reasonable bail ("Excessive bail shall not be required") evaporated with the Bail Reform Act of 1984, As expected, our Supreme Court upheld the Constitutionality of the law by overturning a case before the Second Circuit, and thus also a number of the Supreme Court's prior rulings founded upon the bail clause of the Bill of Rights and the principle of being "innocent until proven guilty" were set aside. The AUSA finds it to his advantage to have a defendant attempt to prepare a defense while behind bars.[1] Many states still offer reasonable bail based on their state's constitution, but not in our federal government, where justice snores.

I have collected hundreds of cases that reinforce the conclusion of there being a tag team, of justice being a facade, and of entire process being turned into a bureaucratic night mare, one which shows no concern for the well being of the accused, most of whom had functioned as a productive citizen. I have reviewed dozens of cases of prisoners, examined their documents, and spoken at length with them; and all this confirms the conclusion that there is no justice in this country, not of the standard practiced in nearly all of the developed countries.[2]

For example, Double Jeopardy, has become a paper right, cases are no longer overturned for its violation. The 1932 controlling case, Blockburger, has been perverted. Formerly if the facts are the same in the subsequent prosecution, then Double Jeopardy was held to have been violated and the indictment was quashed. Today the courts, after Dixon in 1993, look to the statutes. Thus a conspiracy to sell heroin and the sales of heroin can be tried on two different occasions, even though the facts used in both trials are essential the same. Nothing has changed but the charges. The sophistry is that every statute has essential elements (required to be proven) that are different than a related statute. Under Dixon[3] there is no violations of Double Jeopardy. The lack of cases being overturned on the authority of Dixon confirms this point.

Angel Rivera-Feliciano pled guilty to the possession of 22.9 grams of heroin. He received 6 year sentence. A year later while in jail he was charged with a conspiracy to sell the same heroin. His double-jeopardy defense failed because the elements to prove a violation of each statute are different.[4]

There are other ways of end-running the clause that limits the U.S. Attorney’s ability to successively prosecute. Congress set up a commission that has codified sentencing, with the subsequent approval by Congress. Under this code, the relevant conduct clause permits the violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause of our Constitution.

Kurt Witte was charged with possession of 1,000 pounds of marijuana, for which he pled guilty. The government knew of his involvement with a failed attempt to import through Mexico 500 kilograms of cocaine, but didn’t charge him. At sentencing the government argued before the judge that the cocaine should also be figured in as Relevant Conduct, and it was. Witte received the same amount of time as though it had been included as a charge along with the pot.[5]

A year and 6 months later (Sept. of 92), when the government had enough evidence to go to trial over the cocaine, Witte and others were charged, then convicted. Witte thus was sentenced a second time for the same cocaine. The S.C. held his first sentence for the cocaine did not constitute “legislative authorized punishment." This is caca, for the legislature approved (authorized) the Sentencing Guidelines, including the section on relevant conduct. Moreover, relevant conduct is treated in calculating the sentence no differently than a conviction. Double Jeopardy bars being twice punished for the same act, but our courts don't.

The Due Process Clause of the 5^th Amendment states "nor be deprived of life, liberty, property without the due process of law." "Due" in this archaic usage means "fair". Thus "fair process" entails that there is a high degree of confidence in the results reached from the proceedings. The treatment of Kurt Witte fell short of this constitutional mandate. For a plea bargain to comport with this standard requires that it be knowingly done; viz., that Witte would have known of his potential liability. But Kurt did not know that when he gave up his right to trial and agreed to be sentenced for the marijuana that he would also be sentenced for the cocaine. Nor did he know that if he was sentenced for the cocaine along with the pot, that he could--and would--be tried and sentenced a second time for the cocaine. The lack of integrity of our judicial system has been again demonstrated, this time by what the courts permits to be done by the U.S. Attorney's Office to obtain a plea bargain.

Larry Kinder and his brother know well how little American jurisprudence comports with the concept of fairness. Larry had bragged that he had 17 ounces of meth out on the street, so as to gain the confidence of his supplier, who was accepting partial payment for half a pound of methamphet-amine, which then sold for about $10,000. Only his supplier was a police agent.[6] He was charged with both the amount he received and the amount he claimed to have out on the street. The government had no evidence as to what, if any, Kinder had out on the street. The AUSA as per plea agreement dropped the charge for the alleged 17 ounces out on the street. However at sentencing, the AUSA argued for its inclusion under the Relevant-Conduct clause. The tag-team judge agreed, and Larry received 17½ years, his brother a repeat offender received 33½ years.[7] Larry and his brother to avoid receiving at least double the sentence of what they had been offered through the plea bargain if they had gone to trial. Even though, it is quite unlikely a jury would have convicted them of the 17 ounces on such thin evidence, but it is just as likely that the trial judge would have sentenced them to the 17 ounce under the Relevant Conduct Clause.[8] Kinder though he through the bargain he would not do time for the 17 ounces. The Kinder brothers will be doing 85% of their sentence, one much longer than what they and their attorneys had calculated under the Sentencing Guideline Tables, a calculation that the AUSA pretended to go along with during bargaining with defense counsel and during the court hearing in which the judge accepted the guilty plea.[9]

The Relevant Conduct Clause of the Sentencing Guidelines has been frequently abused and the standard set up by the Sentencing Guideline commission with its ratification by Congress makes the appellate review worthless. The appellate court's standard of review (clearly erroneous) entail that the panel must allow all findings of fact at the district level to stand, including those which were quite likely erroneous. This lower standard of proof permits the district judge to sentence a convicted person for counts that he has been acquitted of.

Just a couple decades ago a reasonable doubt based upon unfair proceedings would have sufficed for a new proceedings. For example, if the proceedings were tainted by misconduct, such as evidence withheld by police or a substandard performance by the defense attorney, than the proceedings were redone. And if the proceedings were fair, but new evidence raised significant doubts that a jury would have obtained the same results, then a new trial was supposed to be granted. For plea bargains, if the evidence as to the defendant's innocence or consequences of the plea bargain were not known to the defendant, then on appeal the plea bargain would be overturned and a new proceeding instituted. Today, however, most misconduct is ruled harmless.

For newly discovered evidence to result in a new proceeding, under today's federal standard, it must prove absolute innocence--not mere likely innocence. For example, in a widely publicized rape-murder case--years later reviewed--the DNA evidence from the semen failed to match that of the convicted. However, the judge ruled that and an accomplice (unknown to the court) could have taken part in the rape, and the DNA evidence only proved that the appellant didn't cum in the victim. This is what the judge stated in a television interview as justification for her ruling. In this case other compelling additional evidence was lacking, and it is most unlikely if a jury had the negative DNA evidence that the defendant would have been found guilty. However, the conviction stood because the negative DNA evidence was not sufficient to prove the defendant's absolute innocence.

All aspects of our system of jurisprudence have been changed. It does not surprise me that in a high profile murder case in Philadelphia brought to court years later, and by then the accused had become a French citizen, the French court refused the State's petition for extradition because as it stated: "there is no justice in America." The Court went on to comment that it doubted that the defendant, by French standards, would have received a fair trial.

The SC gave the prosecutors absolute immunity from suit. Richard Imbler was convicted of murder in Los Angeles because the prosecutor “knowingly or negligently used false evidence and suppressed material evidence at the criminal trial.”* In denying the federal suit, the S.C. held: “Better to leave unredressed wrong done by dishonest officers than to subject those who try to do their duty to the constant dread of retaliation."[10] Better the dread of living on death row--it took Imbler 8 years to get his conviction overturned--than require police work and prosecution that comports with Due Process. Judges had long before given themselves Absolute Immunity now prosecutors were also protected.

Police misconduct, whether it was the loss of evidence, “misspeaking”, illegal search, and so on, is treated no differently there immunity to suit is not absolute. They may be sued when acting outside their duty, such as when they steal while doing a search. The same standard applies to other government workers. However, in reality, though government employees may be sued, their defense is in most cases by the U.S. Attorney's Office and being so defended, the claimant must go before a tag-team judge. Few succeed.

Marie Green knows well of these difficulties. She spent more than 14 years pursuing a claim based on the clearly wrongful death of her son, Joseph Jones. The trail of published opinions includes the case being heard in 1980 by the Supreme Court, & three times to the Court of Appeals.[11] There were more, numerous hearings before the District Court and other hearings before the Appellate Court, which were never published.

Joseph Jones, a federal prisoner, had an asthmatic attack that required 8 days of outside hospitalization in July of 1975. Joseph the following month had another asthmatic attack. The prison doctor over the phone instructed the physician's assistant to inject Joseph with the major tranquilizer, Thorazine, a drug which all doctors know to be contraindicated for asthmatic attacks, for it surpasses respiration. Joseph died of respiratory arrest shortly after his second injection of Thorazine. This is clearly a wrongful death amounting to a constitutional violation amounting to Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause.[12] Though the case against the doctor and the BOP was clear, the government defended those named in the suit of Mrs. Marie Green. (The government’s culpability was compounded by the knowingly hiring of a doctor who had a history of psychiatric problems, was on medication, and thus was unfit to practice medicine). As of 1989 the case had not gone to trial, which is when the trial of citations ended. That her name is not on the last case means that she will never get her day in court, but rather an executor of her estate might. The delays and legal hurdles has a chilling effect upon suits. Few attorneys will accept on contingency a case against the government.

Heedful of the intent of the framers of our Constitution, first Chief Justice of the Supreme Court Marshall held in SC opinions that Congress has not the power to abridge our constitutional rights. This holding still stands, but now it has Orwellian meaning. The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment has been "fleshed out" to entails , among other things, that incarceration can never be based on a fear of future crimes, and in general incarceration must follow the commission of a crime and for which the guilt of the accused has been n adjudicated in a court of law. The Eighth Amendment, among its clauses states: "Excessive bail shall not be required." This has been "fleshed out" so as to mean that the accused is entitled to reasonable bail except where the flight risk is substantial, such as in cases of murder. The so-called Bail Reform Act of 1984 violated both the 5^th and 8^th Amendments.. The Reform Act permits incarceration of those whom the prosecution deems could possible commit future crimes while on bail. But under the 5^th Amendment future crimes can never be a cause for incarceration. Moreover, under the 8^th Amendment there is the right to have reasonable bail set.

A District Court denied bail to a mafia boss Anthony Salerno and his underling Vincent Cafaro based on the new act of Congress, even though this Court held they were not flight risks. The Second Circuit found that, "the United States Constitution prohibited pretrial detention on the ground of a danger to the community. . . ."[13] A basic assumption of our legal system had been that of innocence until proven guilty. The Second Circuit recognized this in bold print: "The Due Process Clause reflects the constitutional imperative that incarceration to protect society from criminals may be accomplished only as punishment of those convicted for past crimes and not as regulation of those feared likely to commit future crimes."[14] There also was the violation of the bail clause of the 8th Amendment. Thus the Court of Appeals ordered the District Court to set bail.

The government appealed to the SC with predictable success. They ignored the clear message of the Framers of our Constitution as to the meaning of due process and the right to bail, which had been affirmed by its own prior rulings. Those Framers and others sitting in the First Congress made the bail clause of the Bill of Rights perfectly clear when they passed the First Judiciary Act, which stated that all citizens have a right to bail, except in capital offense. The Second Circuit, among others, was not confused about our constitutional rights when it overturned the Bail Reform Act, rather the new conservative SC was. The new SC no longer considered it obligatory to apply constitutional rules when they were contrary to the expressed intent of Congress. The SC was allowing Congress to rewrite our constitution.

The majority's of SC Justices today do not hold to the position of Justice Marshall and of the First Congress, they do not consider it part of their duties to fetter the police and prosecutors. Now in the minority, Justices Marshall and Brennan in dissent wrote: “Such statutes, consistent with usages of tyranny and the excesses of what bitter experience teaches us to call the police state....”[15] History, both outside and inside our boarders has verified their warning. At home there has been the internment of our citizens descended from the Japanese during the Second World War. And presently there are nearly 3,000 Cubans indefinitely housed in federal prison because they had committed a deportable offense, Cuba won't take them back, and because an INS bureaucrat decided that they shouldn't be released to the street upon completion of their sentence.[16] They are incarcerated not as part of a sentence for a crime, but because of unconstitutional authority given to the INS by Congress. Such bureaucratic action has a name, "a bill of attainder", made infamous by its abuse in France. Article 1, Sec. 9, Cl. 3 prohibits the bill of attainder, so too does the requirements of the Due Process Clause of the Bill of Rights.

The 3-strike laws are a backdoor version of incarceration for fear of future crimes. He is put away for life to prevent him from committing future crimes. There is no pressing need to give a life sentence for a crime, often minor, when the very structure of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines requires that a judge give a significantly longer time to repeat offenders, and if he doesn't, the AUSA will appeal the sentence. The vast majority of 3-strike cases, both state and federal, are against people whose criminal history has shown them to be a social problem rather than harden, violent criminal. Politicians know this; however, they have a political agenda, one that comes before promoting the public weal.

Congress, the President, the Courts, state legislators, and most citizens have demonstrated a myopic understanding of human nature. Rather than making a concerted effort to rehabilitate and establish the bond between society and all its peoples so that each citizen will look to government as a parent and to their fellow members of society as family members (see Plato on the death of Socrates), our government with the approval of the myopic majority use the boot, bars, and poverty in their attempt to promote public tranquility. As George Bernard Shaw warned: “Every fools knows that if you chain a dog to a fence, you make him vicious.” And establishing a society of criminals through long incarceration is equally foolish.

On government cares little for the standards of justice. What sort of examples is this for the criminal? I have shown using court cases how little is left of the Founding Father's vision of a three chambered government with a court system applying the intent of our founding fathers by over-turning laws and constraining the actions of the police and federal prosecutors. Today's High Court has struck down, rather than defend, our Bill of Rights. Congress has created a much different court.

In this brief survey of our federal judicial system, I have reviewed the abrogation of our Bill of Rights by the Court that once protected its citizens from certain governmental abuses. To illustrate this I have examined our Constitutional rights against unreasonable search and seizure; against excessive punishment; to be free from forfeitures except in the case of treason or when the object is the instrument of the crime; to be free of successive punishment for the same criminal act; the requirement that a panel of peers (grand jury) oversee the AUSA's office when they seek to bring criminal charges; that we be given reasonable bail, except in capital cases; that incarceration be the result of due process of law, and that no one should be incarcerated for more than a few days by what is equivalent to of what amounts to a bill of attainder. I have touched upon freedom of speech and the constriction thereof by applying community standards as to obscenity; the Relevant Conduct Clause of the Sentencing Guidelines, which permits inclusion of alleged acts for which to which there is a minimum indica and also acts which a jury found the defendant not guilty; the plea bargaining process and deceptive practices of the AUSA; the typically double sentence given to those who make the government prove their case; the requirement for newly discover evidence to prove absolute innocence; the bribing of witnesses through sentence reduction; the failure of our courts to supervise the workings of the police and prosecution, the absolute freedom of both judges and prosecutors from civil suit; and the handling of civil suits is quite different from other civil suits when the government is named. Our Founding Fathers sought through constitutional law to reduce abuses of power. Today's Congress has a much different vision.

A F T E R W O R D

To the complex mind, there are complex explanations. What follows is a revealing simplification of the logic used by the conservative SC Justices. It fits into a simple syllogism. Chief Justice William Rhenquist and his like function on a simple set of premises. 1) That the will of the people is expressed through the electoral process. 2) The laws the legislatures pass, both state and federal, are thus indirectly an expression of this will of the people. 3) It is not for the courts to undo this expression of the will of the people's elected legislators.[17] 4) As a consequence it is not for the courts to supervise the INS, the prisons, the prosecutors, or the police; this is the turf of the legislative bodies.

As a consequence when there is a conflict between a constitutional clause and a legislative action, in most cases it is the legislative action that is upheld. Consider for example, the issue of mens rea (guilty conscience). For regulatory crimes it has been held that the prosecution must make a showing of willfulness; namely, that the accused be aware that his act was a violation of the law. There is a law against the splitting (structuring) of cash deposits so as to make the deposit under the $10,000, for at that amount the bank must fill out a form to notify the federal government. Prior to November 1986 it was perfectly legal to structure ones deposits to get around the reporting requirement. People routinely for privacy and other reasons split their deposits in order to avoid having to fill out a form that would be submitted to the IRS. The statue which went into effect in 1986 criminalizing structuring contained the legally significant term willful. In resolving a split in the circuits, the SC held that the depositor who structured his funds must be aware that he is not merely doing so to get around a reporting requirement, but that such skirting is itself a violation of the law; i.e., a willful violation. The ruling of the SC relied upon prior ruling of regulatory nature and the meaning of willful, both based upon the Due Process Clause of the Bill of Rights. Namely, that to prosecute for an act which is not obviously criminal, and where the person didn't act with knowledge of a criminal violation of the statute, that his prosecution would violate the Due Process Clause. Tax laws are so handled: a good faith violation of a tax law is not a criminal act. A number of SC ruling held that even when the world "willful" was absent from the statute, it should be understood as applying.

The following year after the SC ruling, Congress spoke by removing the word willful from the statute. In deference to Congress, the S.C. in sub silentio upheld this change, even though the change entailed that the statute, as per their previous ruling, violated the Due Process Clause. When Congress is silent and there is a conflict between the circuit courts, then the SC will act to clarify, even to the point of upholding the Bill of Rights, but when there is an indication from Congress upon a matter which infringes upon the Bill of Rights, then the SC will follow the Congressional lead. This deference-to-Congress logic (syllogism above) has been used to overturn most of the Bill of Rights. The SC's ruling in Ratzlaf[18] is not an exception, nor the CS's silence after Congress took out the word willful. Moreover, the very failure of Congress to act has been viewed by the SC as an action. Thus when the U.S. Attorney's office violates double jeopardy by twice prosecuting for the same offense, the indifference of Congress as to this constitutional violation entails indifference by the SC. This follows from the syllogism. The defacto motto of our High Court is, "Let Congress, elected by the populace, regulate." Our courts are no longer an independent, regulatory body requiring of the other chambers of government an upholding of the Bill of Rights. Though established with this power through constitutional charter by our Founding Fathers, this function has been removed through the power of appointment. We are drifting towards a police state for today there is no third chamber of government functioning to uphold and enforce the Bill of Rights.

Prof. Rod Campbell’s Case: New evidence absolute proves him innocent, yet the District Court Judge will not release him and the Appellate Court will not intervene.

[1] Such a ruling hampers the defendant's attempt to prove his innocents for he is not free to prepare his defense, but must rely upon an attorney, who if appointed by the court receives about 1/4^th his normal hourly rate. Moreover, the accused languishes in pretrial detention facility in conditions much worse than in prison, often for over a year if his case goes to trial. Conditions of confinement plus lack of confidence in ones attorney are strong incentives for not going to trial, and thus to accept the "deal" offered by government in a plea bargin.

[2] Among those reviewed are both Maxey and Fushon. They are not sociopaths. Prosecutors and police do not get to know--in the vast majority of situations--those whom they arrest, charge, and prosecute, nor does the judge who sentences them. To often a person who is fundamentally good gets the same treatment as the sociopath. But laws are to promote the public's wheal, and treating good and rotten apples alike cannot under this guiding principle be justified. There is a fix, first to remove the appointment of justice from politicians. I'd recommend that the appointment of justices be made by those who know and honor the law, a panel of leading law professors. There is a fix for government also, Plato' wrote of it in the Republic. He called them Guardians, and they ought to replace Congressmen.

[3] U.S. v Dixon, 125 L Ed 2d 556 (1993), overturning Grady v Corbin, 109 L Ed 2d 548 (1990), and turning around 18Oº Blockburger, 284 U.S. 304 (1932).

[4] The S.C. found the subsequent prosecution to be a violation of Double Jeopardy and sent Angel’s case back for reconsideration in light of the controlling case, Grady v Corbin, which like Blockburger looks to the facts. On remand the Panel mentioned the controlling case in passing and upheld the second proceedings & punishment, which was clearly contrary to the purpose of the remand by the S.C. U.S. v Riveria-Feliciano, 930 F.2d 951 (1st Cir. 1991). The Supreme Court did not trouble itself to overturn the appellate court a second time. This could have been done without docking the case to be heard: an order could have been signed and issued overturning the appellate court.

[5] Witte v U.S., 132 L Ed 2d 351 (1995). The handling of this case, which involved an educated, middle-class defendant who had cooperated with the government, calls to question the worth of a plea bargain. With tag-team-justice and the typical results of a trial being a sentence two to three times the length of the one offered in the plea bargain, few defendants make the government prove their case. Moreover, if there be a trial in most cases the bargain offered codefendants is withdrawn and they two receive significantly longer sentences--unless they become a witness for the prosecution. Thus a criminal who betrays his friends is rewarded for favorable testimony. The plea-bargain system is rife with abuse, including the threat of much longer sentence if convicted in a trial. I have known people who were innocent, yet they would not risk the increased sentenced if convicted in a trial. And conversely, I have personally known one innocent man who turned down a 6 month deal and received 3 years following his conviction.

My own extensive observations through discussions with those serving time has revealed that about one quarter to one third of those sentenced have received significantly more than they expected when agreeing to sign a plea bargain.

[6] In most if not all of the developed countries, the courts do not permit the government to commit a crime while gathering evidence. of a crime; which in the situation of drugs is that they are not allowed to entice a crime by supplying the drugs which they then arrest the person for--called "a reverse sting". The two principle reasons being that in some cases the defendant would hot have committed the crime but for the inducements of the government agent, and they don't want the government agent to sink to the level of those whom they are seeking to arrest.

[7] In 2000 dollars it cost the taxpayers over $1,8000,000 to house the Kinder brothers for the $10,000 worth of methamphetamine that our government gave them.

[8] U.S. V Boney, 977 F.2d 624 (D.C. Cir. 1992); approving the use at sentencing of acquitted conduct. Ten our of eleven circuits have ruled likewise.

[9] U.S. v Kinder, 946 F.2d 326 (5th Cir. 1991) at 367; Cert. was denied SC Justice White found the duplicity of the AUSA troubling and argued that cert. should be granted, at 119 L Ed 2d 214, (92).

[10] Imb1er v Pachtman, 47 L Ed. 2d 128 (1975), at 128. After Douglas retired.

[11] Carlson v Green, 64 L Ed 2d 15 (1980). Green v Carlson, 581 F.2d 669 (7th Cir. 1978); Green v Carlson, 826 F.2d 647 (7^th Cir. 1987); and Cleveland-Perdue v Brutsche, 881 F.2d 427 (7th Cir. 1989), a case where the daughter of Mrs. Green took up the gauntlet. Estelle v Gamble, 50 L Ed 2d 251 (1976), controlling, on cruel and unusual punishment.

[12] Estelle v Gamble, 50 L Ed 2d 251 (1976), the controlling case for federal prisoners as to the inadequacy of medical treatment using the standard of cruel and unusual punishment. The SC still upholds Estelle V Gamble, 50 L Ed 2d 251 (1976): "Deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. . . proscribed by the Eight Amendment. . . ." It is just that Gamble has been given new meaning, meaning which constricts its application. In cases where prisoners have raised this constitutional issue because the conditions of their confinement were horrendous, the courts will now no longer consider the sum totality of conditions, but must look individually to each condition. The courts have prior looked to all the conditions: housing, recreation, food, medical, etc. However, Joseph's death by a doctor's indefensible action is a single issue.

[13] U.S. V Salerno, 794 F.2d 64 (2^nd Cir. 1986)

[14] Id. 72.

[15] U.S. v Salerno, 95 L Ed 2d 697, 714 (1987).

[16] Their incarceration is based upon the legal fiction that they are not in this country but like someone detained at our border. Thus they are not incarcerated, even though they are all in high-security federal prisons. All 3,000 of those Cubans are supposedly not being punished, just detained, many of them for over a decade. See Barrera-Echavarria v Rison, 21 F.3d 314 (9^th Cir. 1994) and its subsequent en banc reversal for a lively discussion of this and related legal fictions.

[17] The exception, when there is a conflict between state and federal legislative bodies as to the law. Then the Court will more often then not rule in favor of the federal government.

[18] U.S. v Ratzlaf, 976 F. 2d 1280 (9^th Cir. 1992), a ruling making the statute one of strict liability, even though it was shown that the defendant was not acting in willful violation of that statute. The S.C. overturned that circuit and agreed with the 1^st Circuit: intent must not be merely to skirt a regulation, but to violate a known obligation.