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A Table of the Springs of Action
Jeremy Bentham
Added by Bentham after the First Edition:
Since the printing
of this Tract, the following apposite passage from Helvetius was discovered, and pointed out to the Author:
``Chaque
passion a donc ses tours, ses expressions, et sa manière particulière de s'exprimer: aussi l'homme qui, par une analyse exacte
des phrases et des expressions dont se servent les différentes passions, donneroit le signe auquel on peut les reconnoître,
mériteroit sans doute infiniment de la reconnaissance publique. C'est alors qu'on pourroit, dans le faisceau de sentiments
qui produisent chaque acte de notre volonté, distinguer du moins le sentiment qui domine en nous. Jusques-là hommes s'ignoreront
eux-memes, et tomberont, en fait de sentiments, dans les erreurs les plus grossières.
Helvetius, de l'Esprit.
Tom. ii. Disc. iv. Ch. ii. p. 305.
Contents
Original title page
Table Entries
No. I Pleasures and
Pains of the Taste---the Palate, &c.
No. II Pleasures and Pains of the Sexual Appetite.
No. III Pleasures and
Pains of Sense, of the Senses.
No. IV Pleasures and Pains derived from the Matter of Wealth.
No. V Pleasures and
Pains of Power, Influence, Authority, &c.
No. VI Pleasures and Pains of Curiosity.
No. VII Pleasures and Pains
of Amity.
No. VIII Pleasures and Pains of the Moral or Popular Sanction.
No. IX Pleasures and Pains of the Religious
Sanction.
No. X Pleasures and Pains of Sympathy.
No. XI Pleasures and Pains of Antipathy.
No. XII Pains of
Labour.
No. XIII Pains of Death, and Bodily Pains.
No. XIV Pleasures and Pains of the Self-Regarding Class.
Explanations
of the Table
Observations on the Table
Section 1 Pleasures and Pains the basis of all the other entities: these
the only real ones; those, fictitious,
Section 2 No Act, properly speaking, disinterested,
Section 3 Appellatives
Euglogistic, Dyslogistic, and Neutral--Cause of their comparative penury and abundance, as applied to Springs of Action,
Section 4 Good and Bad---Attributives, applied to species of Motives: impropriety of the application---its causes and
effects,
Section 5 Proper subjects of the attributives good and bad are consequences, intentions, acts, habits, dispositions,
inclinations, and propensities: so of the attributives virtuous and vitious, except consequences: how as to interests and
desires,
Section 6 Causes of misjudgment and misconduct---intellectual weakness, inborn and adoptive---sinister interest,
and interest-begotten prejudice,
Section 7 Simultaneously operating motives---co-operating, conflicting, or both,
Section
8 SUBSTITUTION OF MOTIVES. Acts produced by one motive, commonly ascribed to another.---Causes of this misrepresentation
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Last modified: Thu May 11 15:26:04 CDT 2000
The Rationale of Punishment
Book I
General Principles
Chapter III
Of the Ends of Punishment
When any act has been committed which is followed, or threatens to be
followed, by such effects as a provident legislator would be anxious to prevent, two wishes naturally and immediately suggest
themselves to his mind: first, to obviate the danger of the like mischief in future: secondly, to compensate the mischief
that has already been done.
The mischief likely to ensue from acts of the like kind may arise from either of two
sources,either the conduct of the party himself who has been the author of the mischief already done, or the conduct of such
other persons as may have adequate motives and sufficient opportunities to do the like.
Hence the prevention of
offenses divides itself into two branches: Particular prevention, which applies to the delinquent himself; and general prevention,
which is applicable to all the members of the community without exception.
Pain and pleasure are the great springs
of human action. When a man perceives or supposes pain to be the consequence of an act, he is acted upon in such a manner
as tends, with a certain force, to withdraw him, as it were, from the commission of that act. If the apparent magnitude, or
rather value of that pain be greater than the apparent magnitude or value of the pleasure or good he expects to be the consequence
of the act, he will be absolutely prevented from performing it. The mischief which would have ensued from the act, if performed,
will also by that means be prevented.
With respect to a given individual, the recurrence of an offense may be
provided against in three ways:
By taking from him the physical power of offending.
By taking away the desire
of offending.
By making him afraid of offending.
In the first case, the individual can no more commit the
offense; in the second, he no longer desires to commit it; in the third, he may still wish to commit it, but he no longer
dares to do it. In the first case, there is a physical incapacity; in the second, a moral reformation; in the third, there
is intimidation or terror of the law.
General prevention is effected by the denunciation of punishment, and by
its application, which, according to the common expression, serves for an example. The punishment suffered by the offender
presents to every one an example of what he himself will have to suffer if he is guilty of the same offense..
General
prevention ought to be the chief end of punishment, as it is its real justification. If we could consider an offence which
has been committed as an isolated fact, the like of which would never recur, punishment would be useless. It would be only
adding one evil to another. But when we consider that an unpunished crime leaves the path of crime open not only to the same
delinquent, but also to all those who may have the same motives and opportunities for entering upon it, we perceive that the
punishment inflicted on the individual becomes a source of security to all. That punishment, which, considered in itself,
appeared base and repugnant to all generous sentiments, is elevated to the first rank of benefits, when it is regarded not
as an act of wrath or of vengeance against a guilty or unfortunate individual who has given way to mischievous inclinations,
but as an indispensable sacrifice to the common safety.
With respect to any particular delinquent, we have seen
that punishment has three objects, incapacitation, reformation, and intimidation. If the crime he has committed is of a kind
calculated to inspire great alarm, as manifesting a very mischievous disposition, it becomes necessary to take from him the
power of committing it again. But if the crime, being less dangerous, only justifies a transient punishment, and it is possible
for the delinquent to return to society, it is proper that the punishment should possess qualities calculated to reform or
to intimidate him.
After having provided for the prevention of future crimes, reparation still remains to be made,
as far as possible, for those which are passed, by bestowing a compensation on the party injured; that is to say, bestowing
a good equal to the evil suffered.
This compensation, founded upon reasons which have been elsewhere developed,
does not at first view appear to belong to the subject of punishments, because it concerns another individual than the delinquent.
But these two ends have a real connexion. There are punishments which have the double effect of affording compensation to
the party injured, and of inflicting a proportionate suffering on the delinquent; so that these two ends may be effected by
a single operation. This is, in certain cases, the peculiar advantage of pecuniary punishments.
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[RP, Book I, Chapter II] [RP, Book I, Chapter IV]
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