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Jeremy Bentham
INTERNET ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY, THEIR ARTICLE
Jeremy Bentham
(1748-1832) LIFE. A leading theorist in Anglo-American philosophy of law and one of the 'founders' of utilitarianism, Jeremy
Bentham was born in Houndsditch, in London, on 15 February 1748. He was the son and grandson of attorneys, and his early family
life was coloured by a mix of pious superstition (on his mother's side) and Enlightenment rationalism (from his father). Bentham
lived during a time of major social, political and economic change. The 'industrial revolution,' with the massive economic
and social shifts that it brought in its wake, the rise of the middle class, revolutions in France and America--all were reflected
in Bentham's reflections on existing institutions. In 1760 Bentham entered Queen's College, Oxford and, upon graduation in
1764, studied law at Lincoln's Inn. Though qualified to practice law, he never did so. Instead, he devoted most of his life
to writing on matters of legal reform--though, curiously, he made little effort to publish much of what he wrote. Bentham
spent his time in intense study, often writing some eight to twelve hours a day. While most of his best known work deals with
theoretical questions in law, Bentham was an active polemicist and he was engaged for some time in developing projects that
proposed various 'practical' ideas for the reform of social institutions. Although his work came to have an important influence
on political philosophy, Bentham did not write any single text gave the essential principles of his views on this topic. His
most important theoretical work is the Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation (1789), in which much of his
moral theory--which he said reflected 'the greatest happiness principle'--is described and developed. In 1781, Bentham became
associated with the Earl of Shelburne and, through him, came into contact with a number of the leading Whig politicians and
lawyers. Although his work was admired by some, at the time Bentham's ideas were still largely unappreciated. In 1785, he
briefly joined his brother Samuel, in Russia, where he pursued his writing with even more than his usual intensity, and devised
a plan for the now infamous 'Panopticon'- -a model prison where all prisoners would be observable by (unseen) guards at all
times--a project which he had hoped would interest the Czarina Catherine the Great. After his return to England in 1788, and
for some 20 years thereafter, Bentham pursued--fruitlessly and at great expense--the idea of the panopticon. Fortunately,
an inheritance received in 1796 provided him with financial stability. By the late 1790s, Bentham's theoretical work came
to have a more significant place in political reform. Still, his influence was, arguably, still greater on the continent.
(Bentham was made an honorary citizen of the fledgling French Republic in 1792 and his The Theory of Legislation was published
first, in French, by his Swiss disciple, Etienne Dumont, in 1802.) The precise extent of Bentham's influence in British politics
has been a matter of some debate. While he attacked both Tory and Whig policies, both the Reform bill of 1832 (promoted by
Bentham's disciple, Lord Henry Brougham) and later reforms in the century (such as the secret ballot, advocated by Bentham's
friend, George Grote, who was elected to parliament in 1832) reflected Benthamite concerns. The impact of Bentham's ideas
goes further still. Contemporary philosophical and economic vocabulary (e.g., 'international,' 'maximize,' 'minimize,' and
'codification') is indebted to Bentham's proclivity for inventing terms and, among his other disciples were James Mill, and
his son, John (who was responsible for an early edition of some of Bentham's manuscripts), as well as the legal theorist,
John Austin. At his death in London, on 6 June 1832, Bentham left literally tens of thousands of manuscript pages--some of
which was work only sketched out, but all of which he hoped would be prepared for publication. He also left a large estate--used
to finance the newly-established University College, London (for those individuals excluded from university education--i.e.,
non-conformists, Catholics and Jews)--and his cadaver which, per his instructions, was dissected, embalmed, dressed, and placed
in a chair, and resides in a cabinet in a corridor of the main building of University College to this day. The Bentham Project,
set up in the early 1960s at University College, has, as its aim, the publishing of a definitive, scholarly edition of Bentham's
works and correspondence. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- METHOD. Influenced
by the 'philosophes' of the Enlightenment (such as Beccaria, Helvtius, Diderot, D'Alembert, and Voltaire), but also by Locke
and Hume, Bentham's work combined an empiricist approach with a rationalism that emphasized conceptual clarity and deductive
argument. Locke's influence was primarily as the author of the Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding--and Bentham saw in
him a model of one who emphasised the importance of reason over custom and tradition and who insisted on precision in the
use of terms. Hume's influence was not so much on Bentham's method as on his account of the underlying principles of psychological
associationism and on his articulation of the principle of utility which was then still often annexed to theological views.
Bentham's analytical and empirical method is especially obvious when one looks at some of his main criticisms of the law and
of moral and political discourse in general. His principal target was the presence of 'fictions'--in particular, legal fictions.
On his view, to consider any part or aspect of a thing in abstraction from that thing, was to run the risk of confusion or
cause positive deceit. While, in some cases, such 'fictional' terms such as 'relation,' 'right,' 'power,' and 'possession'
were of some use, in many cases their original warrant had been forgotten, so that they survived as the product of either
prejudice or inattention. In those cases where the terms could be 'cashed out' in terms of the properties of real things,
they could continue to be used but, otherwise, they were to be abandoned. Still, Bentham hoped to eliminate legal fictions
as far as possible from the law--including the legal fiction that there was some original contract that explained why there
was any law at all. He thought that, at the very least, clarifications and justifications could be given that avoided the
use of such terms. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- HUMAN NATURE. For Bentham,
morals and legislation can be described scientifically, but such a description requires an account of human nature. Just as
nature is explained through reference to the laws of physics, so human behaviour can be explained by reference to the two
primary motives of pleasure and pain; this is the theory of psychological hedonism. There is, Bentham admits, no direct proof
of such an analysis of human motivation--though he holds that it is clear that, in acting, all people implicitly refer to
it. At the beginning of the Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, Bentham writes that "[n]ature has
placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign masters, pain and pleasure. It is for them alone to point out what we
ought to do, as well as to determine what we shall do. On the one hand the standard of right and wrong, on the other the chain
of causes and effects, are fastened to their throne. They govern us in all we do, in all we say, in all we think: every effort
we can make to throw off our subjection, will serve but to demonstrate and confirm it". From this we see that, for Bentham,
pleasure and pain serve not only as explanations for action, but also define one's good. It is, in short, on the basis of
pleasures and pains, which can exist only in individuals, that Bentham thought one could construct a calculus of value. Related
to this fundamental hedonism is a view of the individual as exhibiting a natural rational self-interest-- a psychological
egoism. In his "Remarks on Bentham's Philosophy," (1833) Mill cites Bentham's The Book of Fallacies (London: Hunt,
1824, pp. 392-3) that "[i]n every human breast... self-regarding interest is predominant over social interest; each person's
own individual interest over the interests of all other persons taken together." Fundamental to the nature and activity
of individuals, then, is their own well-being, and reason--as a natural capability of the person--is considered to be subservient
to this end. Bentham believed that the nature of the human person can be adequately described without mention of social relationships.
To begin with, the idea of "relation" is but a "fictitious entity", though necessary for 'convenience
of discourse.' And, more specifically, he remarks that "the community is a fictitious body," and it is but "the
sum of the interests of the several members who compose it". Thus, the extension of the term 'individual' is, in the
main, no greater and no less than the biological entity. Bentham's view, then, is that the individual--the basic unit of the
social sphere--is an "atom" and there is no 'self' or 'individual' greater than the human individual. A person's
relations with others--even if important--are not essential and describe nothing that is, strictly speaking, necessary to
its being what it is. Finally, the picture of the human person presented by Bentham is based on a psychological associationism
indebted to David Hartley and David Hume; Bentham's analysis of 'habit' (which is essential to his understanding of society
and, especially, political society) particularly reflects associationist presuppositions. On this view, pleasure and pain
are objective states and can be measured in terms of their intensity, duration, certainty, proximity, fecundity and purity.
This allows, then, both for an objective determination of an activity or state and for a comparison with others. Bentham's
understanding of human nature reveals, in short, not only a psychological and ontological, but a moral, individualism where,
to extend the critique of utilitarianism made by Graeme Duncan and John Gray, ("The Left Against Mill," in New Essays
on John Stuart Mill and Utilitarianism, Eds. Wesley E. Cooper, Kai Nielsen and Steven C. Patten, 1979) "the individual
human being is conceived as the source of values and as himself the supreme value." --------------------------------------------------------------------------------
MORAL PHILOSOPHY. As Elie Halvy notes, there are three principal characteristics of which constitute the basis of Bentham's
moral and political philosophy: the greatest happiness principle, universal egoism and the artificial identification of one's
interests with those of others. Though these characteristics are present throughout his work, they are particularly evident
in the Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, where Bentham is concerned with articulating rational principles
that would provide a basis, and guide, for legal, social and moral reform. To begin with, Bentham's moral philosophy reflects
what he calls at different times 'the greatest happiness principle' or 'the principle of utility'--a term which he borrows
from Hume. In adverting to this principle, however, he was not referring to just the usefulness of things or actions, but
to the extent to which these things or actions promote the general happiness. Specifically, then, what is morally obligatory
is that which produces the greatest amount of happiness for the greatest number of people, happiness being determined by reference
to the presence of pleasure and the absence of pain. Thus, Bentham writes, "By the principle of utility is meant that
principle which approves or disapproves of every action whatsoever, according to the tendency which it appears to have to
augment or diminish the happiness of the party whose interest is in question: or, what is the same thing in other words, to
promote or to oppose that happiness." And Bentham emphasises that this applies to "every action whatsoever."
That which does not maximize the greatest happiness (such as an act of pure ascetic sacrifice) is, therefore, morally wrong.
(Unlike some of the previous attempts at articulating a universal hedonism, Bentham's approach is thoroughly naturalistic.)
Bentham's moral philosophy, then, clearly reflects his psychological view that the primary motivators in human beings are
pleasure and pain. Bentham admits that his version of the principle of utility is something that does not admit of direct
proof--but he notes that this is not a problem as some explanatory principles do not admit of any such proof, and all explanation
must start somewhere. But this, by itself, does not explain why another's happiness--or the general happiness--should count.
And, in fact, he provides a number of suggestions that could serve as answers to the question of why we should be concerned
with the happiness of others. First, Bentham says, the principle of utility is something to which individuals, in acting,
refer either explicitly or implicitly--and this is something that can be ascertained and confirmed by simple observation.
Indeed, Bentham held that all existing systems of morality can be "reduced to the principles of sympathy and antipathy"--which
is precisely that which defines utility. A second argument found in Bentham is that, if pleasure is the good, then it is good
irrespective of whose pleasure it is. Thus, a moral injunction to pursue or maximize pleasure has force independently of the
specific interests of the person acting. Bentham also suggests that individuals would reasonably seek the general happiness
simply because the interests of others are inextricably bound up with their own--though he recognised that this is something
that is easy for individuals to ignore. Nevertheless, Bentham envisages a solution to this as well. Specifically, he proposes
that making this identification of interests obvious and, when necessary, bringing diverse interests together, would be the
responsibility of the legislator. Finally, there are, Bentham held, advantages to a moral philosophy based on a principle
of utility. To begin with, the principle of utility is (compared to other moral principles) clear, allows for objective and
disinterested public discussion, and enables decisions to be made where there seem to be conflicts of (prima facie) legitimate
interests. Moreover, in calculating the pleasures and pains involved in carrying out a course of action-- the 'hedonic calculus'--there
is a fundamental commitment to human equality. The principle of utility presupposes that 'one man is worth just the same as
another man' and so there is a guarantee that, in calculating the greatest happiness "each person is to count for one
and no one for more than one." For Bentham, then, there was no inconsistency between his psychological hedonism and egoism,
and the greatest happiness principle. Thus, moral philosophy or ethics can be simply described as "the art of directing
men's action to the production of the greatest possible quantity of happiness, on the part of those whose interest is in view".
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY. Bentham was regarded
as the central figure of a group of intellectuals called, by Elie Halvy, "the philosophic radicals"; both J. S.
Mill and Herbert Spencer can be counted among the 'spiritual descendants' of this group. While it would be too strong to claim
that the ideas of the philosophic radicals reflected a common political theory, it is nevertheless correct to say that they
agreed that many of the social problems of late eighteenth and early nineteenth century England were due to an antiquated
legal system and to the control of the economy by a hereditary landed gentry opposed to modern capitalist institutions. As
discussed in the preceding section, for Bentham, the principles that govern morals also govern politics and law, and political
reform required a clear understanding of human nature. While he develops a number of principles already present in Anglo-Saxon
political philosophy, he breaks with that tradition in significant ways. In his earliest work, A Fragment on Government (1776)
(an excerpt from a longer work published only in 1928 as Comment on Blackstone's Commentaries), Bentham attacked the legal
theory of Sir William Blackstone. Bentham's target was, primarily, Blackstone's defense of tradition in law. Bentham advocated
the rational revision of the legal system, a restructuring of the process of determining responsibility and of punishment
and a more extensive freedom of contract. This, he believed, would favour not only the development of the community, but the
personal development of the individual. Bentham's attack on Blackstone targeted more than the latter's use of tradition, however.
Against Blackstone and against a number of earlier thinkers, including Locke, Bentham repudiated many of the concepts underlying
their political philosophies, such as natural right, state of nature, and 'social contract'. Bentham's work, then, attempted
to outline positive alternatives to the preceding 'traditionalisms.' Not only did he work to reform and restructure existing
institutions but he promoted broader suffrage and self (i.e., representative) government. Law, Liberty and Government: The
notion of liberty present in Bentham's account is what is now generally referred to as 'negative' liberty--freedom from external
restraint or compulsion. Bentham says that "[l]iberty is the absence of restraint" and, so, to the extent that one
is not hindered by others, one has liberty and is 'free'. Bentham denies that liberty is 'natural' (in the sense of existing
'prior to' social life and as thereby imposing limits on the state) or that there is an a priori sphere of liberty in which
the individual is sovereign. In fact, Bentham holds that people have always lived in society, and so there can be no state
of nature (though he does distinguish between political society and 'natural society') and no 'social contract' (a notion
which he held was not only unhistorical but pernicious). Nevertheless, he does note that there is an important distinction
between one's public and private life that has morally significant consequences, and he holds that liberty is a good--that,
even though it is not something that is a fundamental value, it reflects the greatest happiness principle. Correlative with
this account of liberty, Bentham (as Hobbes before him) viewed law as 'negative.' Given that pleasure and pain are fundamental
to--indeed, provide--the standard of value for Bentham, liberty, because 'pleasant', was a good and its restriction, because
'painful', was an evil. Law, which is by its very nature a restriction of liberty and painful to those whose freedom is restricted,
is a prima facie evil. It is only so far as control by the state is limited that the individual is free. Law is, Bentham recognized,
necessary to social order and good laws are clearly essential to good government. Indeed, perhaps more than Locke, Bentham
saw the positive role to be played by law and government, particularly in achieving community well-being. To the extent that
law advances and protects one's economic and personal goods, and that what government there is, is self- government, law reflects
the interests of the individual. Unlike many earlier thinkers, Bentham held that law is not rooted in a 'natural law' but
is simply a command an expression of the will of the sovereign. (This account of law, later developed by Austin, is characteristic
of legal positivism.) Thus, a law that commands morally questionable or morally evil actions, or that is not based on consent,
is still 'law.' Rights: Bentham's views on rights are, perhaps, best known through the attacks on the concept of 'natural
rights' that appear throughout his work. These criticisms are especially developed in his Anarchical Fallacies (a polemical
attack on the declarations of rights issued in France during the French Revolution), written between 1791 and 1795, but not
published until 1816, in French. Bentham's criticisms here are rooted in his understanding of the nature of law. Rights are
created by the law, and law is simply a command of the sovereign. The existence of law and rights, therefore, requires government.
Rights are also usually (though not necessarily) correlative with duties determined by the law and, as in Hobbes, are either
those which the law explicitly gives us, or those where, within a legal system, the law is silent. The view that there could
be rights, not based on sovereign command, and which pre-exist the establishment of government, is rejected. According to
Bentham, then, the term 'natural right' is a "perversion of language." It is "ambiguous," "sentimental"
and "figurative" and it has anarchical consequences. At best, such a 'right' may tell us what we ought to do; it
cannot serve as a legal restriction on what we can or cannot do. The term 'natural right' is ambiguous, Bentham says, because
it suggests that there are general rights--that is, rights over no specific object--so that one would have a claim on whatever
one chooses. The effect of exercising such a universal, natural 'right' would be to extinguish the right altogether, since
"what is every man's right is no man's right." No legal system could function with such a broad conception of rights.
Thus, there cannot be any general rights in the sense suggested by the French declarations. The notion of 'natural rights'
is, moreover, figurative. Properly speaking, there are no rights anterior to government. The assumption of the existence of
such rights, Bentham says, seems to be derived from the theory of the social contract. Here, individuals form a society and
choose a government through the alienation of certain of their `rights'. But such a doctrine is not only unhistorical, according
to Bentham, it does not even serve as a useful fiction to explain the origin of political authority. Governments arise by
habit or by force and, for contracts (and, specifically, some 'original contract') to bind, there must already be a government
in place to enforce them . Finally, the idea of a natural right is "anarchical." Such a right, Bentham claims, entails
a freedom from all restraint and, in particular, from all legal restraint. Since a natural right would be anterior to law,
it could not be limited by law and, since human beings are motivated by self interest, if everyone had such freedom, the result
would be pure anarchy. To have a right in any meaningful sense entails that others cannot legitimately interfere with one's
rights, and this implies that rights must be capable of enforcement. Such restriction, as noted earlier, is the province of
the law. Bentham concludes, therefore, that the term "[n]atural rights is simple nonsense: natural and imprescriptible
rights, rhetorical nonsense,--nonsense upon stilts." Rights--what Bentham calls "real" rights--then, are fundamentally
legal rights. All rights must be legal and specific (that is, having both a specific object and subject). They ought to be
made because of their conduciveness to "the general mass of felicity" and, correlatively, when their abolition would
be to the advantage of society, rights ought to be abolished. So far as rights exist in law, they are protected; outside of
law, they are at best "reasons for wishing there were such things as rights." While Bentham's essays against natural
rights are largely polemical, many of his objections continue to be influential in contemporary political philosophy. Nevertheless,
Bentham did not dismiss talk of rights altogether. There are some services that are essential to the happiness of human beings
and that cannot be left to others to fulfill as they see fit, and so these individuals must be compelled, on pain of punishment,
to fulfill them. They must, in other words, respect the rights of others. Thus, although Bentham was generally suspicious
of the concept of 'right,' he does allow that the term is useful and, in such work as A General View of a Complete Code of
Laws, he enumerates a large number of rights. While the meaning he assigns to these 'rights' is largely stipulative rather
than descriptive, they clearly reflect principles defended throughout his work. There has been some debate over the extent
to which the rights that Bentham defends are based on, or reducible to, duties or obligations, whether he can consistently
maintain that such duties or obligations are based on the principle of utility, and whether the existence of what Bentham
calls 'permissive rights'--rights one has where the law is silent--is consistent with his general utilitarian view. (This
latter point has been discussed at length by H.L.A. Hart and David Lyons.) --------------------------------------------------------------------------------
BIBLIOGRAPHY OF BENTHAM'S WORKS. The standard edition of Bentham's writings is The Works of Jeremy Bentham, (ed. John Bowring),
London, 1838-1843; Reprinted New York, 1962. The contents are as follows: Volume 1: Introduction; An Introduction to the Principles
of Morals and Legislation; Essay on the Promulgation of Laws, Essay on the Influence of Time and Place in matters of Legislation,
A Table of the Springs of Action, A Fragment on Government: or A Comment on the Commentaries; Principles of the Civil Code;
Principles of Penal law Volume 2: Principles of Judicial Procedure, with the outlines of a Procedural Code; The Rationale
of Reward; Leading Principles of A Constitutional Code, for any state; On the Liberty of the Press, and public discussion;
The Book of Fallacies, from unfinished papers; Anarchical Fallacies; Principles of International Law; A Protest Against law
taxes; Supply without Burden; Tax with Monopoly. Volume 3: Defence of Usury; A Manual of Political Economy; Observations on
the Restrictive and Prohibitory Commercial System; A Plan for saving all trouble and expense in the transfer of stock; A General
View of a Complete Code of Laws; Pannomial Fragments; Nomography, or the art of inditing laws; Equal Dispatch Court Bill;
Plan of parliamentary Reform, in the form of a catechism; Radical Reform Bill; Radicalism not Dangerous. Volume 4: A View
of the Hard Labour Bill; Panopticon, or, the inspection house; Panopticon versus New South Wales; A Plea for the Constitution;
Draught of a Code for the Organisation of Judicial establishment in France; Bentham's Draught for the Organisation of Judicial
establishments, compared with that of a national assembly; Emancipate your colonies; Jeremy Bentham to his fellow citizens
of France, on houses of peers and Senates; Papers Relative to Codification and Public Instruction; Codification Proposal Volume
5: Scotch Reform; Summary View of the Plan of a Judiciary, under the name of the court of lord's delegates; The Elements of
the Art of Packing; "Swear Not At All,"; Truth versus Ashhurst; The King against Edmonds and others; The King against
Sir Charles Wolseley and Joseph Harrison; Optical Aptitude Maximized, expense minimized; A Commentary on Mr Humphreys' Real
Property Code; Outline of a Plan of a General Register of Real Property; Justice and Codification Petitions; Lord Brougham
Displayed; Volume 6: An Introductory View of the rationale of Evidence; Rationale of Judicial Evidence, specially applied
to English Practice, Books I-IV Volume 7: Rationale of Judicial Evidence, specially applied to English Practice, Books V-X
Volume 8: Chrestomathia; A Fragment on Ontology; Essay on Logic; Essay on language; Fragments on Universal Grammar; Tracts
on Poor Laws and pauper management; Observations on the Poor Bill; Three Tracts Relative to Spanish and Portuguese Affairs;
Letters to Count Toreno, on the proposed penal code; Securities against Misrule Volume 9: The Constitutional Code Volume 10:
Memoirs of Bentham, Chapters I-XXII Volume 11: Memoirs of Bentham, Chapters XXIII-XXVI; Analytical Index A new edition of
Bentham's Works is being prepared by The Bentham Project at University College, University of London. This edition includes:
The correspondence of Jeremy Bentham, Ed. Timothy L. S. Sprigge, 10 vols., London : Athlone Press, 1968-1984. [Vol. 3 edited
by I.R. Christie; Vol. 4-5 edited by Alexander Taylor Milne; Vol. 6-7 edited by J.R. Dinwiddy; Vol. 8 edited by Stephen Conway].
An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, Ed. J.H. Burns and H.L.A. Hart, London: The Athlone Press, 1970.
Of laws in general. London: Athlone Press, 1970. A Comment on the Commentaries and A Fragment on Government, Ed. J.H. Burns
and H.L.A. Hart, London: The Athlone Press, 1977. Chrestomathia, Ed. M. J. Smith, and W. H. Burston, Oxford/New York : Clarendon
Press ; Oxford University Press, 1983. Deontology ; together with A table of the springs of action ; and the Article on Utilitarianism.
Ed. Amnon Goldworth, Oxford/New York : Clarendon Press ; Oxford University Press, 1983. Constitutional code : vol. I . Ed.
F. Rosen and J. H. Burns, Oxford/New York : Clarendon Press; Oxford University Press, 1983. Securities against misrule and
other constitutional writings for Tripoli and Greece. Ed. Philip Schofield, Oxford/New York : Clarendon Press ; Oxford University
Press, 1990. Official aptitude maximized : expense minimized. Ed. Philip Schofield, Oxford : Clarendon Press, 1993. Colonies,
commerce, and constitutional law : Rid yourselves of Ultramaria and other writings on Spain and Spanish America. Ed. Philip
Schofield, Oxford/New York : Clarendon Press ; Oxford University Press, 1995. Select list of secondary sources: Halvy, Elie.
La formation du radicalisme philosophique, 3 vols. Paris, 1904 [The Growth of Philosophic Radicalism. Tr. Mary Morris. London:
Faber & Faber, 1928.] Harrison, Ross. Bentham. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1983. Hart, H.L.A. "Bentham on Legal
Rights," in Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence (second series), ed. A.W.B. Simpson (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1973), pp.
171-201. Lyons, David. "Rights, Claimants and Beneficiaries," in American Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 6 (1969),
pp. 173-185. MacCunn, John. Six Radical Thinkers, second impression, London, 1910. Mack, Mary Peter. Jeremy Bentham: An Odyssey
of Ideas 1748-1792. London: Heinemann, 1962. Manning, D.J. The Mind of Jeremy Bentham, London: Longmans, 1968. Plamenatz,
John. The English Utilitarians. Oxford, 1949. Stephen, Leslie. The English Utilitarians. 3 vols., London: Duckworth, 1900.
William Sweet -- wsweet@stfx.ca 1998
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